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Abstract
Using panel data for 106 countries in 1971-1997, we estimate generalized least squares
regressions to explain IMF lending as well as monetary and fiscal policies in the
recipient countries. With respect to moral hazard, we find that a country's rate of
monetary expansion and its government budget deficit is higher the less it has exhausted
its borrowing potential in the Fund and the more credit it has received from the Fund.
As for political business cycles, our evidence indicates that, even with a considerable
number of control variables, IMF credits in the more democratic recipient countries are
larger in pre-election and post-election years. Thus, IMF lending seems to facilitate the
generation of political business cycles, while IMF conditionality may serve as a
scapegoat for unpopular corrective measures after the election. The paper concludes
with implications for IMF reform.
Keywords: IMF programs, political business cycles, moral hazard
JEL classifications: D72, F33, F34
21. Introduction
The International Monetary Fund has come under increasing scrutiny and attack. It has
been shown to be an almost continuous provider of aid to a few dozens of developing
countries. Its policy conditions have frequently been criticized as inappropriate. Its
forecasts are comparatively poor and biased in favour of optimism. The growth of its
staff does not seem to be related to the "need for balance of payments credits" as
defined by the Fund.1
Recently, the International Financial Institutions Advisory Commission (IFIAC)
of U.S. Congress has endorsed many of these criticisms and submitted sweeping
proposals for reform.2
In this paper, we test for the validity of two additional criticisms of IMF policy.
Both are derived from public-choice theory, and both imply that the availability of
subsidized IMF credit has undesirable incentive effects on the governments which are
eligible for these loans.
The first of these criticisms is the "moral-hazard hypothesis" originally proposed
in Vaubel (1983). IMF lending may be interpreted as a (subsidized) income insurance
against adverse shocks. The insurance cover induces the potential recipients to
excessively lower their precautions against such damages or even to intentionally
generate a crisis. It is easy to show that balance of payments crises "can be produced at
will, virtually overnight" by an inappropriate monetary or exchange rate policy
(Niehans 1985: 67f.). There is also a considerable body of evidence that the balance of
payments problems of IMF borrowers have been largely of their own making3 and that
macroeconomic performance during inter-program years deteriorates as the number of
past programs has increased.4 However, the true test of moral hazard is whether the
policies causing these crises are at least partially due to the influence of the IMF.
Accordingly, we explain fiscal and monetary policy by the amount of IMF credit
available or received (section 2).
                                                       
1
 For all these findings see Vaubel (1991) and the sources cited there.
2
 http://phantom-x.gsia.cmu.edu/IFIAC/USMRPTDV.html
3
 See the sources quoted in Vaubel (1991: 205, 207f.) and Evrensel (2000, Table 2).
4
 Evrensel (2000), Table 3. The experience of having received IMF credit in the past seems to raise the
probability of going for another IMF credit in the future. This might be called a "dependency trap" or an
"hysteresis effect".
3The second criticism to be tested is that IMF lending facilitates political business
cycles in the recipient countries. This hypothesis, too, has been suggested in an earlier
paper:
"The ruling politicians try to influence the domestic business cycle in their
favour by generating a boom at the time of election and low popularity and by
reversing the impulse thereafter. IMF lending facilitates the expansion. IMF
conditionality facilitates the contraction. In this way, the IMF tends to contribute
to the generation of political business cycles" (Vaubel 1991: 213).
Thus, there are two parts to this hypothesis: one relating to the pre-election
boom and one to the post-election recession.
Both monetary and fiscal policy can be used to generate a pre-election boom.
This is even true if the exchange rate is immutably fixed. The rate of monetary
expansion compatible with a given exchange rate parity is higher, the larger the central
bank’s sales of foreign exchange.5 In other words, foreign exchange interventions
financed with credits from the IMF permit a higher rate of monetary expansion at a
given exchange rate. Fiscal expansion, in an open economy, tends to induce a real
appreciation because the increase in the budget deficit raises the real interest rate,
attracts foreign capital and thereby shifts demand from foreign to domestic goods. Thus,
a combination of monetary and fiscal expansion is possible even under fixed exchange
rates. Credit from the IMF can be used to finance the central bank’s sales of foreign
exchange and the government’s budget deficit.
If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect that IMF lending is larger before
elections than otherwise. This presupposes that the government of the borrowing
country is more attracted by the subsidized credit than put off by the policy conditions
attached to it.
After the election, policy conditions negotiated with the IMF may serve as a
scapegoat for unpopular corrective measures.6 This part of the hypothesis has recently
been tested by Vreeland (2000). He found that the conclusion of an IMF program is
significantly more likely in a post-election year. As such programs are usually
associated with additional IMF lending, we ask whether current net IMF credits are
larger than usual after the election.
Both parts of the political business cycle hypothesis will be tested in Section 3.
                                                       
5
 This is also true if the reserve currency country sterilizes the intervention. For a verbal explanation see
Vaubel (1991: 212f.).
4Section 4 draws conclusions for IMF reform.
2. The moral hazard of IMF lending
The regression is a pooled time-series cross-section analysis (panel data). Our annual
data cover the years 1971-97 and extend to the 106 countries that have obtained IMF
credit during this period. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or
years, our panel data are unbalanced and our number of observations depends on the
choice of explanatory variables. We test for fixed country and time effects. Since the
time effects are not significant,7 we include only country dummies. However, their
coefficients are not reported in the tables. Since we find significant heteroscedasticity,
we use generalized least squares with cross-section weights and White
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances8. To avoid simultaneity
bias, all explanatory variables are lagged one year. All variables, their precise
definitions and data sources are listed in the appendix.
In Table 1, the government budget deficit relative to GDP is regressed on three
variables checking for moral hazard:9
– the amount of new credits (net of repayments) which the country has received from
the IMF outside the reserve tranche during the previous year relative to its GDP
("new IMF credit"),
– the amount of IMF credit outstanding at the beginning of the year relative to the
country's quota ("exhaustion of quota") and
– a dummy with the value of one if a country is eligible to draw under the IMF's
highly concessionary SAF/ESAF facility and zero otherwise.10
In addition, we use the following control variables:
– an "election dummy" which is equal to one in the election year and the pre-election
year,11
– the rate of real GDP growth in the previous year,
                                                                                                                                                                 
6
 The scapegoat interpretation has also been proposed by Spaventa (1983), Vaubel (1983, 1986, 1991),
Remmer (1986), Putnam (1988), Stein (1992), Edwards and Santaella (1993), Bjork (1995), Dixit (1996)
and Przeworski and Vreeland (2000).
7
 Contrary to this, Conway (1994) and Joyce (1992) report a significant influence of time dummies.
8
 To check for heteroscedasticity, we used a likelihood ratio test.
9
 If there is a deficit, the dependent variable has a positive value.
10
 This variable has also been used by Schuknecht (1996, 2000).
5– the London interbank rate of borrowing (LIBOR) in the previous year,
– the external strength of the currency in the previous year (as measured by the ratio
of the fixed official parity and the market exchange rate),
– a "war dummy" which is equal to one if there was a war in the previous year,
– the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP in the previous year,
– the change in a country's terms of trade in the previous year and
– the lagged endogenous variable.
These control variables replicate Schuknecht's analysis (1996, 2000) as closely
as possible.
As expected the variable new IMF credit relative to GDP does have a
significantly positive effect on the budget deficit. The budget deficit falls significantly
as the country's quota with the IMF is increasingly exhausted. Countries eligible for
SAF/ESAF credits have significantly higher budget deficits.
The results also indicate that the budget deficit is larger at the time of elections12
and war. An increase in LIBOR significantly raises the budget deficit – probably
because governments have to pay higher debt service. Appreciation of the currency
reduces the budget deficit. This may be because fiscal expansion is not needed to bring
about a real appreciation if the currency is strong or because appreciation reduces the
budgetary cost of servicing the foreign debt. The more open a country as measured by
the sum of exports and imports relative to GDP the smaller is the government’s budget
deficit. The government of a relatively open country is more exposed to a foreign
financing constraint and international political competition. A country`s terms of trade
and its growth rate of real GDP, however, do not have significant effects on the budget
deficit.13 The lagged endogenous variable indicates partial adjustment. The whole
regression explains more than 71 percent of the variance of the budget deficit.
Table 2 replicates the analysis for monetary policy as measured by the rate of
monetary expansion (money and quasi money). In the case of monetary policy, LIBOR
measures the external monetary constraint, i.e., monetary conditions in the dollar area.
We also tried the change in international reserves (net of IMF lending) and the inflation
rate but we obtained coefficient signs which cannot be explained by economic theory.
The same is true for interactions between the election dummy and the other explanatory
variables. We dropped the variable for the external value of the currency and the
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 We do not include separate dummies for the election year and the pre-election year because their
coefficients were not significantly different.
12
 This is in line with Schuknecht (1996, 2000).
6SAF/ESAF-dummy because their coefficients were not significantly different from zero
and their inclusion reduced the adjusted R2.
As can be seen in Table 2, our moral hazard variables new IMF credit and
exhaustion of quota take the expected signs, and both are significant at the one percent
level.14 Monetary expansion is significantly more rapid prior to elections, whereas faster
economic growth leads to slower monetary expansion. A tightening of monetary
conditions in the dollar area significantly reduces monetary expansion elsewhere. As
expected, the rate of monetary growth rises in times of war. In addition, more open
economies experience lower rates of monetary growth – probably because they are
more exposed to monetary policy competition and the import price inflation that is
caused by currency depreciation.15 However, even with the country dummies, the whole
regression explains only about 16 percent of the variance of monetary expansion
(unweighted R2).
To summarize, there is strong evidence that IMF lending generates moral hazard
in monetary and fiscal policy.
3. Does the IMF facilitate political business cycles in the recipient
countries?
In testing for political business cycles, we use the same methodology and data
basis as in section 2. Once more, all quantitative explanatory variables are lagged one
year.
In column 1 of Table 3, new net IMF credit relative to GDP16 is exclusively
regressed on three time dummies: one dummy for pre-election years, one for election
years and one for post-election years. As can be seen, the pre-election and the post-
election dummies have positive coefficients which are significant at the one percent
level.17
The pre- and post-election effects on new IMF credit have to be interpreted as
demand shifts: the member governments shift their credit demand functions upward,
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 We include these variables to keep the analysis comparable with Schuknecht (1996, 2000).
14
 However, the exhaustion of IMF credit no longer takes a significantly negative coefficient if the change
in international reserves is included. By contrast, the significantly positive coefficient of new IMF credits
is insensitive to the choice of control variables.
15
 This is in line with theoretical arguments presented by Harry Johnson (1970: 105) and empirical
evidence presented by David Romer (1993) and Vaubel (2000: Table 3).
16
 Note that this variable may also be negative because IMF credit is measured net of repayments.
17
 The positive post-election dummy confirms the results of Przeworski and Vreeland (2000).
7while the Fund’s credit supply function remains unchanged. In fact, the borrowing
governments may simply be drawing on available credit lines. Unfortunately, as the
regression is enlarged by additional explanatory variables, the distinction between
demand and supply effects is increasingly blurred. Almost all the additional regressors
may be interpreted at the same time as determinants of the governments’ credit demand
and as criteria by which the Fund judges the creditworthiness of its applicants. Thus, a
meaningful simultaneous or two-stage estimation is not feasible18. However, for our
purpose of checking the robustness of the election effects, a reduced-form estimate is
sufficient.
In column 2, we add a dummy for democratic regimes as classified by Alvarez et
al. (1996). On average, as can be seen, the more democratic countries receive less credit
from the IMF.19 A conceivable explanation is that more democratic countries are
usually more developed than those subject to more authoritarian regimes. However, the
correlation coefficient between the democracy index and GDP per capita is only 0.14. In
any case, the critique that the Fund uses its credit to support undemocratic regimes (e.g.
Assetto 1988, Bandow 1994) is consistent with the evidence.
In column 3, we add three (lagged) macroeconomic policy variables:
– the rate of monetary expansion,
– the overall budget deficit relative to GDP and
– general government consumption relative to GDP.
All three variables can closely be controlled by the economic policy makers of the
borrowing countries. Thus, they may be indicators of moral hazard (section 2). Owing
to data constraints, the number of observations drops by almost a half.
The results of column 3 seem to suggest that high government consumption and
low monetary expansion lead to large IMF credits and that the budget deficit is
irrelevant.20 However, as we introduce more variables, the results for the fiscal variables
will be overturned. What is important for our purpose at this stage is the robustness of
the electoral effects. The pre- and post-election dummies take even larger and more
                                                       
18
 Almost all empirical studies of IMF lending are confined to reduced-form estimates: Bird, Orme
(1981), Officer (1982), Cornelius (1986), McDonald (1986), Joyce (1992), Edwards, Santaella (1993),
Conway (1994), Rowlands (1994), Bird (1995), Thacker (1999) and Bird, Rowlands (2000). The only
exceptions are Knight, Santaella (1997) and Przeworski, Vreeland (2000). However, the separation of
demand from supply factors in these studies is rather dubious. For example, Knight and Santaella classify
the level of international reserves exclusively as a determinant of demand even though it also affects the
IMF’s willingness to lend.
19
 This is in line with Edwards and Santaella (1993: 427).
20
 The results for the budget deficit are in line with Przeworski and Vreeland (2000: Table 1). The
positive influence of government consumption is confirmed by Joyce (1992: Table 2).
8significant coefficients than before. The coefficient of the election-year dummy stays
insignificant and the democratic regime dummy keeps its significantly negative
influence.
Column 4 includes six additional (lagged) macroeconomic variables which are
not current policy instruments but clearly affected by them:
– the rate of real GDP growth,
– the inflation rate,
– international reserves relative to imports,
– the share of foreign short-term private debt in total foreign debt,
– the net inflow of foreign direct investment relative to GDP and
– the current account balance as a percent of GDP.
All additional coefficients are (at least marginally) significant and easy to explain:
– An acceleration of real GDP growth reduces the demand for, and supply of, IMF
credit because real growth serves as an indicator of need.21
– An acceleration of inflation reduces the supply of IMF credit because it signals a
lack of creditworthiness.22
– An increase of international reserves relative to imports reduces the demand for,
and the supply of, IMF credit because there is no need for support.23
– An increase in the share of foreign short-term private debt raises the demand for,
and supply of, IMF credit because it is a sign of financial crisis.24
– An increase in the inward flow of foreign direct investment reduces the demand
for IMF credit.25
– If the current account balance increases, the demand for, and supply of, IMF
credit falls because the so-called "balance of payments need" diminishes.26
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 This is in line with Bird and Rowlands (2000). Rowlands (1994), however, did not find a significant
influence of real GDP growth on IMF agreements.
22
 This is contrary to most other studies: Bird and Orme (1981: 565), Bird (1995: 146) and McDonald
(1986: 98) report positive coefficients. Only Evrensel (2000) found lower inflation rates in pre-program
years.
23
 This is also reported by McDonald (1986: 96), Joyce (1992: Table 2), Edwards, Santaella (1993: 427),
Rowlands (1994: Table 1), Knight, Santaella (1997: Table 5), Thacker (1999: Table 4), Bird, Rowlands
(2000: Full Sample, Table 3) and Przeworski, Vreeland (2000: Table 1).
24
 As Diamond and Rajan (2000) point out, it is, however, not obvious which is the cause and which the
effect.
25
 However, the effect on the supply for IMF credit is positive because, notably at a time of crisis, it is a
sign of growing creditworthiness. Thus, as in Knight, Santaella (1997: Table 4) and Przeworski, Vreeland
(2000: Table 1), the demand effect dominates.
26
 This positive relationship was also found by Bird and Orme (1981: 565), Conway (1994: Table 1), Bird
(1995: 147), Thacker (1999: Table 4) and Bird, Rowlands (2000: Full Sample, Table 3).
9Note that the inclusion of the inflation rate destroys the significance of
government consumption. But the budget deficit now takes a significantly negative
coefficient. The electoral effects are still present. The post-election dummy stays
significant at the one percent level, while the pre-election dummy is significant at the
five percent level.
In column 5, we allow for four additional variables which are not, or hardly,
affected by current domestic monetary and fiscal policy:
– LIBOR,
– the share of exports to other IMF-supported countries,
– a dummy for years of war and
– a dummy for years in which IMF quotas were under review.
The results can be explained in the following way:
– A tightening of foreign monetary conditions as measured by LIBOR raises the
demand for, and supply of, IMF credit because it puts pressure on the exchange
rate.27
– If a large share of exports goes to countries which are in crisis and supported by
the Fund, the country is exposed to contagion. Moreover, IMF policy conditions
usually aim at import reduction. This hits the exports of their trading partners.28
– During wars, credit supply from the IMF is restricted because the Fund refuses
to finance wars.29
– At the time of a quota review, the IMF supplies more credit because its staff
hopes to obtain a larger quota increase when its resources are exhausted ("hurry-
up lending").30
The inclusion of the additional variables raises the coefficients and significance
levels of the electoral variables. Both the pre- and the post-election dummies are
significant at the one percent level. The coefficient of the election year dummy is
negative and almost significant. While the share of foreign short-term private debt loses
its significance, international reserves are now fully significant.
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 Bird and Rowlands (2000: Table 3 ) did not find a significant influence of the absolute level in LIBOR.
However, they found a positive influence of the change in LIBOR. Contrary to this, Rowlands (1994:
Table 1) reports a negative influence of LIBOR on the frequency of IMF arrangements.
28
 Since countries in deep crisis have to reduce their trade deficits anyway, the reduction in imports does
not prove the effectiveness of a Fund program, however.
29
 This variable was found to be insignificant in Rowlands (1994: Table 1).
30
 This effect was also significant in Vaubel (1991). In addition, we allowed for the degree to which the
IMF has exhausted its lending potential (use of Fund credit/average GDP) but, unlike Przeworski and
Vreeland (2000), we did not find a significant effect.
10
In column 6 we distinguish between genuinely democratic elections and
elections under authoritarian regimes as classified by Alvarez et al. (1996). It turns out
that elections under authoritarian regimes do not have a fully significant effect on IMF
credit. Authoritarian regimes are less inclined to stimulate the economy before elections
because there is no real democratic competition. Under authoritarian regimes, only the
post-election dummy is marginally significant. Its negative coefficient contradicts our
expectations. One possible explanation is that the Fund may cut its lending after the
election in order to compensate for the excessive pre-election lending and force the
government into a new program and new policy conditions in the following year.
Alternatively, elections in these countries may focus international attention on the
authoritarian nature of their governments so that the Fund is more reluctant to lend to
them.
In the democratic countries, net credit from the Fund is significantly larger
before and after elections. However, the coefficient of the election year dummy is now
significantly negative. Several explanations are possible. First, as the country has
obtained more credit in the pre-election year, less is left in the election year. Moreover,
the Fund may be hesitant to grant credit in an election year because it does not want to
openly support the ruling government.31 Finally, as already mentioned, the Fund may
cut its lending shortly after the election (within the election year) in order to force the
government into a new program.
Once more, we tried interactions of the electoral dummies with the other
explanatory variables but without success.
Finally, in column 7, we add the lagged endogenous variable to check for partial
adjustment. The influence of elections is almost unchanged. The only major change is
that the coefficient of international reserves drops back into insignificance32. The
coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable indicates that 87 percent of the desired
adjustment takes place within the first year.
To summarize, there is strong evidence that IMF lending depends on the date of
elections and contributes to political business cycles in the more democratic borrowing
countries.33 In the year prior to the election, the IMF increases its lending to democratic
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 Bredenkamp and Schadler (1999: 223) provide evidence that countries run large budget deficits and
postpone corrective measures before elections. As a consequence, the IMF may actually cancel the
program. However, they only present case studies.
32
 This may be due to multicollinearity between the lagged endogenous and other lagged variables.
33
 Dreher (2001) shows that the same is true for the World Bank’s loans.
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countries by about 0.11 percent of GDP.34 If the credit is immediately used to finance a
policy of monetary and/or fiscal expansion and if, on average, both the stimulus and the
election take place in mid-year, the implicit average lag of effect on the economy at
election time is one year. Since interest on IMF credit is lower than what the borrowing
governments would have to pay in the world capital market (if they have access at all),
the availability of subsidized IMF credit reduces the opportunity cost of over-
expansionary macroeconomic policies and government transfers to marginal voters
prior to elections.
For the year in which the election takes place (but possibly after the election),
our results indicate a credit shortfall of similar size. In the year after the election, IMF
lending rises by 0.14 percent of GDP in the democratic countries as new programs are
negotiated. This is consistent with the view that, after the election, the IMF serves as a
scapegoat for unpopular policy conditions in the democratic countries.
The country effects are not reported in the tables but the extreme cases ought to
be mentioned. In the final equation, the largest positive country effects have been
obtained for Jamaica (1.61 % of GDP), Mauretania (1.27 %), Lesotho (0.93 %) and
Zimbabwe (0.78 %). However, even with the country dummies, the final equation
explains only about 21 percent of the variance of IMF lending (unweighted statistics).
For which countries is the election effect on net IMF credit significant? To
answer this question, we estimated time-series regressions for all countries for which at
least ten observations are available. Since the samples are much smaller than in the
panel analysis, we used only six explanatory variables: the dummies for the pre-
election, election and post-election year and the three quantitative variables which took
the most significant regression coefficients in the complete panel analysis, i.e., real
growth, the current account balance and inflation. We have tested for integration and
cointegration.35 Table 4 lists the 29 countries for which significant election effects were
found.
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 In 1996 the average new credit from the Fund among drawing countries amounts to 1.1 percent of their
GDP. In that year the smallest credit drawn was 0.06 percent of GDP (for Papua New Guinea) and the
largest was about 3.9 percent of GDP (for Guyana).
35
 We also tested for deterministic trends and serial correlation in the error terms. In those cases where a
Lagrange Multiplier test indicated serial correlation at the 0.05 level of significance, we modelled the
error structure using autoregressive terms. Series with significant deterministic trends were detrended. We
used first differences of  those series which were found to be integrated of order one but were not
12
4. Implications for IMF Reform
The moral hazard of IMF lending and its role in facilitating political business cycles
calls for reform of the Fund as an international financial institution. Obviously, the most
radical way to stop such abuses is to prevent the Fund from lending or abolish it
altogether. Short of this, moral hazard could be reduced, first, by establishing IMF
conditionality on an ex-ante basis (as suggested by Vaubel, 1991, and the International
Financial Institutions Advisory Commission, 1999). For example, all member states in
which monetary expansion exceeds an n-year moving average of real GDP growth by
more than x percent could be excluded from IMF credits. With respect to fiscal policy, a
limit for the budget deficit relative to GDP could be set (as is now in force in the
European Union).
Secondly, moral hazard could be fought by raising the opportunity cost of
borrowing from the IMF. The interest rate subsidy could be eliminated (Vaubel 1991).
Indeed, as recommended by the IFIAC (1999), it could be replaced by a penalty so that
the IMF becomes a lender of last resort. In the past, it has rather been a lender of first
resort.
Thirdly, it is possible to reduce moral hazard by strictly limiting the period over
which a country may obtain credit from the Fund (Vaubel 1983, IFIAC 1999). Loans
could be limited to, say, three years, with no possibility of renewal or new borrowing
from the Fund for another six years. This implies that the Fund would leave the task of
development aid to the World Bank or other specialized development agencies.
While these solutions to the moral-hazard problem are relatively straight-
forward, it is much more difficult to prevent the Fund from contributing to political
business cycles. This is because such lending is merely temporary and because past
performance is not a reliable guide to the future. Ex-ante conditionality can prevent
incumbent governments from turning to the Fund after having embarked on
overexpansionary policies before the election. But ex-ante conditionality does not
prevent governments that have behaved well in the past from obtaining IMF loans, even
at an interest penalty, and then spending the proceeds to finance a pre-election boom.
The conditions have to relate to the subsequent use of the loan, prohibiting a future
increase of monetary expansion and the budget deficit.
                                                                                                                                                                 
cointegrated. Cointegrated series were used in levels. In testing for unit roots, we used the procedure
proposed by Enders (1995), chapter 4.
13
It is generally assumed that the Fund has imposed such conditions in the past
(even though they were usually not published during our period of observation36).
Moreover, our results indicate that the IMF has reduced lending when monetary
expansion and the budget deficit had increased. However, as our results also show, this
type of conditionality has not stopped pre-election borrowing. It seems to be necessary
to improve the enforcement of such conditions by introducing more effective sanctions.
The IFIAC (1999) has suggested that borrowers should have to submit some sort
of collateral. Another possibility is that governments which have violated the agreed
conditions, notably prior to their reelection, are excluded, as far as possible, from
development aid for at least one term of office. In this respect, cooperation between the
IMF and the World Bank, the regional development agencies and the members of the
Official Development Aid Committee at the OECD may have to be strengthened and
formalized. In the long run, of course, countries which have repeatedly abused IMF
credit to finance pre-election spending in the past, could be excluded from future IMF
lending. In this respect, our time-series regressions for individual countries (Table 4)
may be a useful guide.
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 Since 1998, the conditions have been published unless the borrowing government has objected.
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Definitions and data sources
Section 2:
“Monetary Expansion”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1999): Average annual growth rate in money and quasi money. Money and quasi
money comprise the sum of currency outside banks, demand deposits other than those
of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency deposits of
resident sectors other than the central government. The change in the money supply is
measured as the difference in end-of-year totals relative to the level of M2 in the
preceding year.
“Overall Budget Deficit in percent of GDP”, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1999): Overall budget deficit is total expenditure and lending minus
repayments less current and capital revenue and official grants received. Data are for
central government only.
“New IMF credit in percent of GDP”, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1999): New IMF credit denotes net changes in repurchase obligations to
the IMF for all uses of IMF resources (excluding those resulting from drawings on the
reserve tranche). The changes in these obligations, shown for the end of the year
specified, comprise net purchases under the credit tranches, including enlarged access
resources, and all special facilities (the buffer stock, compensatory financing, extended
fund, and oil facilities), trust fund loans, and operations under the structural adjustment
and enhanced structural adjustment facilities.
“Exhaustion of IMF Quota”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1999), IMF (2000): The amount of IMF credit outstanding at the beginning of the year
relative to the country’s quota in the IMF.
SAF/ESAF eligibility, IMF: http//www.imf.org
Election years, Gorvan (1989) and Journal of Democracy (various years)
15
“Real GDP growth”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999):
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local
currency.
“LIBOR”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999): The
average three-month London interbank offer rate on U.S. dollar deposits.
“External strength of the currency”, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1999), Pick (various years), Currency Data & Intelligence (various
years): Ratio of fixed official exchange rate to parallel market exchange rate, each per
unit of foreign currency. The ratio of official to parallel exchange rate measures the
premium people must pay, relative to the official exchange rate, to exchange the
domestic currency for dollars in the black market.
War years, The Almanac of World Military Power (1995), Bruno, Easterly (1996),
Sivard (1980): The Dummy takes a value of one if there was a war in that year with at
least 1000 people killed.
“Sum of Exports and Imports in percent of GDP”, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (1999)
“Change of Terms of Trade”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(1999): Measures the change in a country’s terms of trade compared to the previous
year.
Section 3 (additional variables):
“Dummy for democratic regime”, Alvarez et al. (1996): Dummy which takes the value
of one, if a country is classified as democratic in that year. A country is not classified as
democratic when its chief executive and legislature were not elected and there are not at
least two political parties.
“Government consumption as a share of GDP”, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (1999)
16
”Inflation”, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999): Consumer
price index in percent.
“International reserves/ imports”, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1999): Gross international reserves comprise holdings of monetary gold
and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary authorities. The gold
component of these reserves is valued at year-end (December 31) London prices.
Reserves are expressed in terms of the number of months of imports of goods and
services which could be paid for. It is net of transactions with the IMF.
“Foreign short-term private debt/ foreign debt”, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (1999): Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity
of one year or less and interest in arrears on long-term debt. Total external debt is debt
owed to nonresidents repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services. Total external
debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private nonguaranteed long-term
debt and short-term debt.
“Net inflow of foreign direct investment in percent of GDP”, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (1999): Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting
management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of
payments.
“Current account balance in percent of GDP”, International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (1999)
“Share of exports to other IMF supported countries”, United Nations: International
Trade Statistics Yearbook (various years): Share of a country’s exports to countries
with an IMF program in that year.
“Dummy for year of IMF quota review”, IMF: http//www.imf.org: Dummy which takes
the value of one for years in which IMF quotas were under review and zero otherwise.
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Table 1
Government budget deficit in percent of GDPa
(panel data, 64 countries, 1972-97, generalized least squares)
explanatory variables
new IMF credit in percent of GDP (t-1)
exhaustion of IMF quota (t-1)
dummy for SAF/ESAF eligibility
dummy for election and pre-election years
real GDP growth (t-1)
LIBOR (t-1)
external strength of the currency (t-1)
dummy for war year (t-1)
sum of exports and imports in percent of
GDP (t-1)
change of terms of trade (t-1)
lagged endogenous variable
0.143
(2.83*)
– 0.114
(– 2.84*)
1.039
(7.66*)
0.263
(4.44*)
0.003
(0.45)
0.122
(11.79*)
-0.002
(-4.25*)
0.302
(3.50*)
-0.018
(-5.12*)
-1.87E-07
(-1.23)
0.515
(17.12*)
R2 (unweighted)
no. of observations
0.710
                 874
Notes:
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported.
a
 If  there is a budget deficit, the dependent variable has a positive value.
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported.
t-statistics in parentheses:
*: significant at the 1 percent level
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Table 2
Monetary expansion, money and quasi-money
(panel data, 76 countries, 1972-97, generalized least squares)
explanatory variables
new IMF credit in percent of GDP (t-1)
exhaustion of quota (t-1)
dummy for election and pre-election year
real GDP growth (t-1)
LIBOR (t-1)
dummy for war year (t-1)
sum of exports and imports in percent of
GDP (t-1)
lagged endogenous variable
0.280
(2.90*)
– 0.235
       (– 3.57*)
           0.798
        (7.38*)
        – 0.330
(– 24.55*)
        – 0.130
 (– 11.35*)
9.033
(11.38*)
– 0.054
(– 2.23**)
0.354
(3.89*)
R2 (unweighted)
no. of observations
0.157
     1,588
Notes:
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported.
t-statistics in parentheses:
*:  significant at the 1 percent level
**: significant at the 5 percent level
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Table 3
New net credit from the IMF in percent of GDP
(panel data, 106 countries, 1971-97, generalized least squares)
explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
dummy for pre-election year
dummy for pre-election year
   * dummy for democratic
   regime
dummy for pre-election year
   * dummy for authoritarian
   regime
dummy for election year
dummy for election year
   * dummy for democratic
   regime
dummy for election year
   * dummy for authoritarian
   regime
dummy for post-election year
dummy for post-election year
   * dummy for democratic
   regime
dummy for post-election year
   * dummy for authoritarian
   regime
dummy for democratic regime
monetary expansion (t-1)
budget deficit in percent of
   GDP (t-1)
0.009
(2.69*)
 0.001
( 0.25)
0.013
(3.53*)
0.031
(3.75*)
0.009
(1.08)
0.017
(1.95o)
 -0.022
(-2.76*)
0.048
(5.30*)
0.010
(1.21)
0.030
(3.62*)
 -0.058
(-6.20*)
 -9.56a
(-4.76*)
0.001
(0.26)
0.044
(2.36**)
 -0.008
(-0.48)
0.058
(3.13*)
 -0.105
(-4.94*)
 -9.36a
(-2.51**)
 -0.009
(-2.37**)
0.052
(2.81*)
 -0.033
(-1.88o)
0.069
(3.57*)
 -0.131
(-5.03*)
 -0.11b
(-2.72*)
 -0.011
(-2.70*)
0.102
(5.36*)
0.040
(0.99)
 -0.103
(-5.85*)
0.010
(0.25)
0.128
(5.70*)
 -0.061
(-1.67o)
 -0.136
(-3.98*)
 -0.11b
(-2.74*)
 -0.008
(-1.93**)
0.111
(5.89*)
0.026
(0.68)
-0.103
(-6.01*)
0.018
(0.47)
0.138
(6.23*)
-0.068
(-1.90o)
-0.124
(-3.66*)
-0.12b
(-2.84*)
-0.007
(-1.70o)
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continued (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
government consumption in
   percent of GDP (t-1)
real GDP growth (t-1)
inflation (t-1)
international reserves/
   imports (t-1)
foreign short-term private
   debt/foreign debt (t-1)
net inflow of foreign direct
   investment in percent of
   GDP (t-1)
0.012
(5.46*)
0.007
(1.32)
-0.013
(-7.26*)
-9.16b
(-5.07*)
-0.008
(-1.87o)
0.005
(4.24*)
-0.041
(-5.61*)
0.009
(1.62)
-0.017
(-9.14*)
-9.75b
(-5.14*)
-0.013
(-3.07*)
0.002
(1.53)
-0.042
(-5.19*)
0.004
(0.66)
-0.018
(-8.96*)
-9.68b
(-4.83*)
-0.011
(-2.32*)
0.003
(1.62)
-0.039
(-4.57*)
0.002
(0.35)
-0.017
(-7.98*)
-8.68b
(-4.47*)
-0.006
(-1.48)
0.003
(1.82o)
-0.033
(-3.99*)
current account balance in
   percent of GDP (t-1)
LIBOR (t-1)
share of exports to other IMF
   supported countries (t-1)
dummy for war year (t-1)
dummy for year of IMF
   quota review
lagged endogenous variable
-0.018
(-7.46*)
-0.026
(-8.25*)
0.013
(4.11*)
0.007
(5.20*)
-0.105
(-4.46*)
0.100
(4.43*)
-0.026
(-7.78*)
0.017
(5.01*)
0.007
(5.01*)
-0.116
(-4.54*)
0.080
(3.36*)
-0.025
(-7.36*)
0.015
(4.40*)
0.006
(4.41*)
-0.107
(-4.31*)
0.080
(3.57*)
0.129
(4.11*)
R2 (unweighted)
R2 adj. (unweighted)
No. of observations
0.079
0.033
 2,244
0.084
0.042
    2,033
0.173
0.112
   1,251
0.189
0.113
      993
0.208
0.126
      923
0.211
0.126
     923
0.207
0.121
     923
Notes:
The coefficients of the country dummies are not reported.
t-statistics in parentheses:
*: significant at the 1 percent level       **: significant at the 5 percent level       o: significant at the 10 percent level
a: E-07
b: E-05
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Table 4
New net credit from the IMF in percent of GDP
(time series analysis)
country pre-election
year effect
election
year effect
post-election
year effect
AR-terms
R2 period
Albania -0.474
(-1.92)
0.527
(2.77o)
-0.847
(-2.26o)
1 0.91 1986-97
Bangladesh 0.221
(0.94)
-0.177
(-1.10)
0.312
(2.62**)
2 0.09 1973-97
Benin 0.638
(1.83o)
-0.106
(-0.52)
0.023
(0.08)
0.21 1975-95
Bolivia 0.337
(0.68)
0.702
(1.52)
1.025
(2.13 o)
0.55 1976-97
Brasilia 0.076
(0.76)
0.057
(0.69)
0.216
(2.37**)
1,2 0.67 1978-97
Bulgaria 0.320
(0.29)
3.814
(3.93**)
-0.235
(-0.435)
1 0.57 1986-97
Burkina
Faso
0.411
(2.02o)
-0.483
(-1.67)
0.319
(2.12o)
1 0.33 1976-95
Burundi 0.834
(4.55*)
-0.147
(-0.50)
0.421
(3.29**)
0.92 1986-97
Chad 0.925
(3.92*)
-0.711
(-1.39)
0.703
(0.85)
1 0.33 1972-97
Costa Rica 1.043
(1.99o)
0.210
(0.45)
1.093
(2.14o)
0.41 1978-97
Ethiopia 0.368
(2.84**)
0.078
(0.41)
0.173
(0.74)
1 0.40 1984-97
Guinea 0.579
(12.84**)
0.166
(1.34)
-0.144
(-1.69)
1 0.91 1988-97
Guyana 0.664
(0.70)
4.824
(4.21**)
3.228
(4.34**)
0.75 1979-96
Hungary 1.329
(5.21**)
0.448
(1.66)
1.871
(5.84*)
3 0.82 1987-97
Indonesia 0.276
(0.97)
0.653
(2.03o)
0.077
(0.35)
0.30 1982-97
Jamaica 1.529
(1.20)
-1.441
(-1.85)
3.293
(2.47**)
2,4 0.33 1982-97
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Country pre-election
year effect
election
year effect
post-election
year effect
AR-terms
R2 period
Jordan 1.244
(4.31*)
0.173
(0.27)
1.449
(3.66*)
4 0.10 1983-97
Mauritania 1.443
(3.25*)
-1.143
(-4.28*)
-0.602
(-0.675)
2 0.78 1979-96
Morocco 0.053
(0.16)
0.953
(4.69*)
0.665
(1.40)
4 0.56 1981-97
Nepal 0.231
(1.73o)
0.177
(1.12)
0.023
(0.11)
0.03 1971-97
Niger -0.617
(-2.06o)
-0.084
(-0.13)
0.840
(2.71**)
-0.17 1976-96
Pakistan -0.123
(-0.73)
-0.451
(-2.05o)
0.825
(3.04*)
4 0.57 1975-97
Panama 1.690
(2.54**)
1.184
(1.95o)
0.385
(0.66)
1 0.49 1979-96
Philippines 0.753
(2.71**)
0.306
(0.96)
0.312
(1.02)
0.31 1978-97
Sierra Leone 2.995
(2.30**)
-1.036
(-1.11)
2.448
(2.71**)
0.46 1979-96
Sri Lanka 2.193
(3.94*)
-0.146
(-0.39)
2.267
(4.19*)
2 0.30 1978-97
Togo 0.628
(1.44)
2.254
(3.71*)
2.988
(7.63*)
3 0.40 1978-95
Tunisia 0.024
(0.06)
1.222
(2.43**)
-0.142
(-0.25)
2 0.08 1979-97
Uruguay -0.063
(-0.10)
-1.692
(-2.82**)
1.159
(1.88o)
1 0.60 1981-97
*: significant at the 1 percent level
**: significant at the 5 percent level
o: significant at the 10 percent level
The intercepts and the regression coefficients and t-statistics of the three quantitative
variables (real growth, current account balance, inflation) are not reported.
